.. The view of the former, whether in its causes or effects,
like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains (to carry
our pretensions no higher) communicates a secret joy and
satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud
or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination.
And this concession being once made, the difficulty is over; and a
natural unforced interpretation of the phenomena of human life will
afterwards, we hope, prevail among all speculative
inquirers."--(IV. p. 320.)
The moral approbation, therefore, with which we regard acts of justice
or benevolence rests upon their utility to society, because the
perception of that utility or, in other words, of the pleasure which
they give to other men, arouses a feeling of sympathetic pleasure in
ourselves. The feeling of obligation to be just, or of the duty of
justice, arises out of that association of moral approbation or
disapprobation with one's own actions, which is what we call conscience.
To fail in justice, or in benevolence, is to be displeased with oneself.
But happiness is impossible without inward self-approval; and, hence,
every man who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will find
his best reward in the practice of every moral duty. On this topic Hume
expends much eloquence.
"But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society
than these here delivered, which represent virtue in all her
genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with
ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with
which many divines and some philosophers have covered her; and
nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability;
nay, even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety.
Pages:
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242