However, it may plausibly be said, that so slight
a barrier lies between thought and speech, that any moral quality
attached to the latter is easily transferred to the former; and that,
since open slander is obviously opposed to the interests of society,
injustice of thought, which is silent slander, must become inextricably
associated with the same blame.
But, granting the utility to society of all kinds of benevolence and
justice, why should the quality of those virtues involve the sense of
moral obligation?
Hume answers this question in the fifth section, entitled, _Why Utility
Pleases_. He repudiates the deduction of moral approbation from
self-love, and utterly denies that we approve of benevolent or just
actions because we think of the benefits which they are likely to confer
indirectly on ourselves. The source of the approbation with which we
view an act useful to society must be sought elsewhere; and, in fact, is
to be found in that feeling which is called sympathy.
"No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of
others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure, the
second pain. This every one may find in himself. It is not probable
that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple
and universal, whatever attempts may have been made for that
purpose."--(IV. p. 294, _Note_.)
Other men's joys and sorrows are not spectacles at which we remain
unmoved:--
" .
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