This image or faint notion, we persuade
ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing
itself; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial
that at present it can. We consider not that the fantastical desire
of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions."--(IV. p.
110, _note_.)
Moreover, the moment the attempt is made to give a definite meaning to
the words, the supposed opposition between free will and necessity turns
out to be a mere verbal dispute.
"For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions?
We cannot surely mean, that actions have so little connexion with
motive, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow
with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one
affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the
other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By
liberty, then, we can only mean _a power of acting or not acting
according to the determinations of the will_; that is, if we choose
to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now
this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every
one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of
dispute."--(IV. p. 111.)
Half the controversies about the freedom of the will would have had no
existence, if this pithy paragraph had been well pondered by those who
oppose the doctrine of necessity.
Pages:
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227