That is to say: the belief in a God and
in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature, that the
former can no more vanish, than the latter can ever be torn from
me.
"The only point to be remarked here is that this act of faith of
the intellect (_Vernunftglaube_) assumes the existence of moral
dispositions. If we leave them aside, and suppose a mind quite
indifferent to moral laws, the inquiry started by reason becomes
merely a subject for speculation; and [the conclusion attained] may
then indeed be supported by strong arguments from analogy, but not
by such as are competent to overcome persistent scepticism.
"There is no one, however, who can fail to be interested in these
questions. For, although he may be excluded from moral influences
by the want of a good disposition, yet, even in this case, enough
remains to lead him to fear a divine existence and a future state.
To this end, no more is necessary than that he can at least have no
certainty that there is no such being, and no future life; for, to
make this conclusion demonstratively certain, he must be able to
prove the impossibility of both; and this assuredly no rational man
can undertake to do. This negative belief, indeed, cannot produce
either morality or good dispositions, but can operate in an
analogous fashion, by powerfully repressing the outbreak of evil
tendencies.
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