When a sea-anemone multiplies by division, there is a time during which
it is said to be one animal partially divided; but, after a while, it
becomes two animals adherent together, and the limit between these
conditions is purely arbitrary. So in mineralogy, a crystal of a
definite chemical composition may have its substance replaced, particle
by particle, by another chemical compound. When does it lose its
primitive identity and become a new thing?
Again, a plant or an animal, in the course of its existence, from the
condition of an egg or seed to the end of life, remains the same neither
in form, nor in structure, nor in the matter of which it is composed:
every attribute it possesses is constantly changing, and yet we say that
it is always one and the same individual. And if, in this case, we
attribute identity without supposing an indivisible immaterial something
to underlie and condition that identity, why should we need the
supposition in the case of that succession of changeful phenomena we
call the mind?
In fact, we ascribe identity to an individual plant or animal, simply
because there has been no moment of time at which we could observe any
division of it into parts separated by time or space. Every experience
we have of it is as one thing and not as two; and we sum up our
experiences in the ascription of identity, although we know quite well
that, strictly speaking, it has not been the same for any two moments.
So with the mind.
Pages:
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200