"Again, when we will needs force _Experience_ to pronounce some
sentence, even on those subjects which lie beyond her sphere,
neither can she perceive any material difference in this
particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be
governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety
of causes in their operations. We have specimens in miniature of
both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a vegetable or animal
body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from these
samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes,
than thought: and as these causes never operate in two persons
after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think
exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike
at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the
disposition of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books,
of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are
sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and
communicate to it very different movements and operations. As far
as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate
in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious
adjustment of springs and principles.
"How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of
that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to
your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world in which you trace
the material? Have we not the same reason to trace the ideal world
into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we
stop and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material
world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on _in
infinitum_? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that
infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian
philosopher and his elephant.
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