So again,
there are large numbers of highly intelligent persons who rather pride
themselves on their fixed belief that our volitions have no cause; or
that the will causes itself, which is either the same thing, or a
contradiction in terms.
Hume's argument in support of what appears to be a true proposition,
however, is of the circular sort, for the major premiss, that all
distinct ideas are separable in thought, assumes the question at issue.
But the question whether the idea of causation is necessary, or not, is
really of very little importance. For, to say that an idea is necessary
is simply to affirm that we cannot conceive the contrary; and the fact
that we cannot conceive the contrary of any belief may be a presumption,
but is certainly no proof, of its truth.
In the well-known experiment of touching a single round object, such as
a marble, with crossed fingers, it is utterly impossible to conceive
that we have not two round objects under them; and, though light is
undoubtedly a mere sensation arising in the brain, it is utterly
impossible to conceive that it is not outside the retina. In the same
way, he who touches anything with a rod, not only is irresistibly led to
believe that the sensation of contact is at the end of the rod, but is
utterly incapable of conceiving that this sensation is really in his
head. Yet that which is inconceivable is manifestly true in all these
cases. The beliefs and the unbeliefs are alike necessary, and alike
erroneous.
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