Nature must have
provided some other principle, of more ready and more general use
and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence
in life as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the
uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this
doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with
regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly
established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the
rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without
any exception or reserve. It is custom alone which engages animals,
from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual
attendant, and carries their imagination from the appearance of the
one to conceive the other, in that particular manner which we
denominate _belief_. No other explication can be given of this
operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive
beings which fall under our notice and observation."--(IV. pp.
122-4.)
It will be observed that Hume appears to contrast the "inference of the
animal" with the "process of argument or reasoning in man." But it would
be a complete misapprehension of his intention, if we were to suppose,
that he thereby means to imply that there is any real difference between
the two processes. The "inference of the animal" is a potential belief
of expectation; the process of argument, or reasoning, in man is based
upon potential beliefs of expectation, which are formed in the man
exactly in the same way as in the animal.
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