It is an operation of the soul, when we are
so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we
receive benefits, or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these
operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning
or process of the thought and understanding is able either to
produce or to prevent."--(IV. pp. 52-56.)
The only comment that appears needful here is, that Hume has attached
somewhat too exclusive a weight to that repetition of experiences to
which alone the term "custom" can be properly applied. The proverb says
that "a burnt child dreads the fire"; and any one who will make the
experiment will find, that one burning is quite sufficient to establish
an indissoluble belief that contact with fire and pain go together.
As a sort of inverted memory, expectation follows the same laws; hence,
while a belief of expectation is, in most cases, as Hume truly says,
established by custom, or the repetition of weak impressions, it may
quite well be based upon a single strong experience. In the absence of
language, a specific memory cannot be strengthened by repetition. It is
obvious that that which has happened cannot happen again, with the same
collateral associations of co-existence and succession. But, memories of
the co-existence and succession of impressions are capable of being
indefinitely strengthened by the recurrence of similar impressions, in
the same order, even though the collateral associations are totally
different; in fact, the ideas of these impressions become generic.
Pages:
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123