The fact that the beliefs of memory precede the use of language, and
therefore are originally purely instinctive, and independent of any
rational justification, should have been of great importance to Hume,
from its bearing upon his theory of causation; and it is curious that he
has not adverted to it, but always takes the trustworthiness of memories
for granted. It may be worth while briefly to make good the omission.
That I was in pain, yesterday, is as certain to me as any matter of fact
can be; by no effort of the imagination is it possible for me really to
entertain the contrary belief. At the same time, I am bound to admit,
that the whole foundation for my belief is the fact, that the idea of
pain is indissolubly associated in my mind with the idea of that much
past time. Any one who will be at the trouble may provide himself with
hundreds of examples to the same effect.
This and similar observations are important under another aspect. They
prove that the idea of even a single strong impression may be so
powerfully associated with that of a certain time, as to originate a
belief of which the contrary is inconceivable, and which may therefore
be properly said to be necessary. A single weak, or moderately strong,
impression may not be represented by any memory. But this defect of weak
experiences may be compensated by their repetition; and what Hume means
by "custom" or "habit" is simply the repetition of experiences.
"wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation
produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without
being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we
always say that this propensity is the effect of _Custom_.
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