It has been seen that a memory is a complex idea made up of at least two
constituents. In the first place there is the idea of an object; and
secondly, there is the idea of the relation of antecedence between that
object and some present objects.
To say that one has a recollection of a given event and to express the
belief that it happened, are two ways of giving an account of one and
the same mental fact. But the former mode of stating the fact of memory
is preferable, at present, because it certainly does not presuppose the
existence of language in the mind of the rememberer; while it may be
said that the latter does. It is perfectly possible to have the idea of
an event A, and of the events B, C, D, which came between it and the
present state E, as mere mental pictures. It is hardly to be doubted
that children have very distinct memories long before they can speak;
and we believe that such is the case because they act upon their
memories. But, if they act upon their memories, they to all intents and
purposes believe their memories. In other words, though, being devoid of
language, the child cannot frame a proposition expressive of belief;
cannot say "sugar-plum was sweet;" yet the psychical operation of which
that proposition is merely the verbal expression, is perfectly
effected. The experience of the co-existence of sweetness with sugar has
produced a state of mind which bears the same relation to a verbal
proposition, as the natural disposition to produce a given idea, assumed
to exist by Descartes as an "innate idea" would bear to that idea put
into words.
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