"Thus far I have discussed that which we know as things: it remains
that I should speak of that which we know as truths. For example,
when we think that it is impossible to make anything out of
nothing, we do not imagine that this proposition is a thing which
exists, or a property of something, but we take it for a certain
eternal truth, which has its seat in the mind (_pensee_), and is
called a common notion or an axiom. Similarly, when we affirm that
it is impossible that one and the same thing should exist and not
exist at the same time; that that which has been created should not
have been created; that he who thinks must exist while he thinks;
and a number of other like propositions; these are only truths, and
not things which exist outside our thoughts. And there is such a
number of these that it would be wearisome to enumerate them: nor
is it necessary to do so, because we cannot fail to know them when
the occasion of thinking about them presents itself, and we are not
blinded by any prejudices."
It would appear that Locke was not more familiar with Descartes'
writings than Hume seems to have been; for, viewed in relation to the
passages just cited, the arguments adduced in his famous polemic against
innate ideas are totally irrelevant.
It has been shown that Hume practically, if not in so many words,
admits the justice of Descartes' assertion that, strictly speaking,
sensations are innate; that is to say, that they are the product of the
reaction of the organ of the mind on the stimulus of an "unknown cause,"
which is Descartes' "je ne sais quoi.
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