The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion, and
solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells,
sounds, heat, and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures that
arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the
cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like. Both philosophers
and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct
continued existence. The vulgar only regard the second as on the
same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar again esteem the
third to be merely perceptions, and consequently interrupted and
dependent beings.
"Now 'tis evident that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion,
colour, sounds, heat, and cold, as far as appears to the senses,
exist after the same manner with motion and solidity; and that the
difference we make between them, in this respect, arises not from
the mere perception. So strong is the prejudice for the distinct
continued existence of the former qualities, that when the contrary
opinion is advanced by modern philosophers, people imagine they can
almost refute it from their reason and experience, and that their
very senses contradict this philosophy. 'Tis also evident that
colours, sounds, &c., are originally on the same footing with the
pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a
fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on
perception nor reason, but on the imagination.
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