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CHAPTER III.
THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS.
Admitting that the sensations, the feelings of pleasure and pain, and
those of relation, are the primary irresolvable states of consciousness,
two further lines of investigation present themselves. The one leads us
to seek the origin of these "impressions;" the other, to inquire into
the nature of the steps by which they become metamorphosed into those
compound states of consciousness, which so largely enter into our
ordinary trains of thought.
With respect to the origin of impressions of sensation, Hume is not
quite consistent with himself. In one place (I. p. 117) he says, that it
is impossible to decide "whether they arise immediately from the object,
or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from
the Author of our being," thereby implying that realism and idealism are
equally probable hypotheses. But, in fact, after the demonstration by
Descartes, that the immediate antecedents of sensations are changes in
the nervous system, with which our feelings have no sort of resemblance,
the hypothesis that sensations "arise immediately from the object" was
out of court; and that Hume fully admitted the Cartesian doctrine is
apparent when he says (I. p. 272):--
"All our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the
disposition of our nerves and animal spirits."
And again, though in relation to another question, he observes:--
"There are three different kinds of impressions conveyed by the
senses.
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