However, as we have seen, he
expressly excludes everything but the emotions and the passions from
this group.
It is necessary therefore to amend Hume's primary "geography of the
mind" by the excision of one territory and the addition of another; and
the elementary states of consciousness will stand thus:--
A. IMPRESSIONS.
A. Sensations of
_a._ Smell.
_b._ Taste.
_c._ Hearing.
_d._ Sight.
_e._ Touch.
_f._ Resistance (the muscular sense).
B. Pleasure and Pain.
C. Relations.
_a._ Co-existence.
_b._ Succession.
_c._ Similarity and dissimilarity.
B. IDEAS.
Copies, or reproductions in memory, of the foregoing.
And now the question arises, whether any, and if so what, portion of
these contents of the mind are to be termed "knowledge."
According to Locke, "Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or
disagreement of two ideas;" and Hume, though he does not say so in so
many words, tacitly accepts the definition. It follows, that neither
simple sensation, nor simple emotion, constitutes knowledge; but that,
when impressions of relation are added to these impressions, or their
ideas, knowledge arises; and that all knowledge is the knowledge of
likenesses and unlikenesses, co-existences and successions.
It really matters very little in what sense terms are used, so long as
the same meaning is always rigidly attached to them; and, therefore, it
is hardly worth while to quarrel with this generally accepted, though
very arbitrary, limitation of the signification of "knowledge.
Pages:
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90