Very little attention to what
passes in the mind is sufficient to show, that these conceptions involve
assumptions of an extremely hypothetical character. And the first
business of the student of psychology is to get rid of such
prepossessions; to form conceptions of mental phenomena as they are
given us by observation, without any hypothetical admixture, or with
only so much as is definitely recognised and held subject to
confirmation or otherwise; to classify these phenomena according to
their clearly recognisable characters; and to adopt a nomenclature which
suggests nothing beyond the results of observation. Thus chastened,
observation of the mind makes us acquainted with nothing but certain
events, facts, or phenomena (whichever name be preferred) which pass
over the inward field of view in rapid and, as it may appear on careless
inspection, in disorderly succession, like the shifting patterns of a
kaleidoscope. To all these mental phenomena, or states of our
consciousness,[18] Descartes gave the name of "thoughts,"[19] while
Locke and Berkeley termed them "ideas." Hume, regarding this as an
improper use of the word "idea," for which he proposes another
employment, gives the general name of "perceptions" to all states of
consciousness. Thus, whatever other signification we may see reason to
attach to the word "mind," it is certain that it is a name which is
employed to denote a series of perceptions; just as the word "tune,"
whatever else it may mean, denotes, in the first place, a succession of
musical notes.
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