And the historical progress of every science depends on the
criticism of hypotheses--on the gradual stripping off, that is, of their
untrue or superfluous parts--until there remains only that exact verbal
expression of as much as we know of the fact, and no more, which
constitutes a perfect scientific theory.
Philosophy has followed the same course as other branches of scientific
investigation. The memorable service rendered to the cause of sound
thinking by Descartes consisted in this: that he laid the foundation of
modern philosophical criticism by his inquiry into the nature of
certainty. It is a clear result of the investigation started by
Descartes, that there is one thing of which no doubt can be entertained,
for he who should pretend to doubt it would thereby prove its existence;
and that is the momentary consciousness we call a present thought or
feeling; that is safe, even if all other kinds of certainty are merely
more or less probable inferences. Berkeley and Locke, each in his way,
applied philosophical criticism in other directions; but they always, at
any rate professedly, followed the Cartesian maxim of admitting no
propositions to be true but such as are clear, distinct, and evident,
even while their arguments stripped off many a layer of hypothetical
assumption which their great predecessor had left untouched. No one has
more clearly stated the aims of the critical philosopher than Locke, in
a passage of the famous _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, which,
perhaps, I ought to assume to be well known to all English readers, but
which so probably is unknown to this full-crammed and much examined
generation that I venture to cite it:
"If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can
discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things
they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I
suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be
more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension:
to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit
down in quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination,
are proved to be beyond the reach of our capacities.
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