What is commonly called science, whether mathematical, physical, or
biological, consists of the answers which mankind have been able to
give to the inquiry, What do I know? They furnish us with the results of
the mental operations which constitute thinking; while philosophy, in
the stricter sense of the term, inquires into the foundation of the
first principles which those operations assume or imply.
But though, by reason of the special purpose of philosophy, its
distinctness from other branches of scientific investigation may be
properly vindicated, it is easy to see that, from the nature of its
subject-matter, it is intimately and, indeed, inseparably connected with
one branch of science. For it is obviously impossible to answer the
question, What can we know? unless, in the first place, there is a clear
understanding as to what is meant by knowledge; and, having settled this
point, the next step is to inquire how we come by that which we allow to
be knowledge; for, upon the reply, turns the answer to the further
question, whether, from the nature of the case, there are limits to the
knowable or not. While, finally, inasmuch as What can I know? not only
refers to knowledge of the past or of the present, but to the confident
expectation which we call knowledge of the future; it is necessary to
ask, further, what justification can be alleged for trusting to the
guidance of our expectations in practical conduct.
It surely needs no argumentation to show, that the first problem cannot
be approached without the examination of the contents of the mind; and
the determination of how much of these contents may be called knowledge.
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